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DREAMS, SKEPTICISM, 
AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH* 
CHARLES M. DUNLOP 
The topic of dreaming has received a good deal of attention in 
recent years, owing in large measure to a provocative paper by 
Margaret Macdonald I and two publications by Norman Malcolm. 2 
Both Macdonald and Malcolm argue, from rather different direc- 
tions, against the historically well-entrenched idea that dream 
states are sufficiently like waking states that we may mistake one 
for the other. Their strategy is to try to undermine Cartesian 
skepticism by arguing that there are radical conceptual disparities 
between dreaming and waking. If the 'anti-traditionalist' account 
of Macdonald and Malcolm could be established as correct, it 
would appear to follow that dream skepticism has no foothold. I 
shall argue, however, that purely conceptual considerations do not 
clearly favor the Macdonald-Malcolm theory, and that future 
experimental studies may refute it. 
Much of the critical literature engendered by the afore- 
mentioned papers attempts to reinstate the traditional view of  
dreaming. 3 Yet there is a notable lack of any precise formulation 
of the view being defended. I hope to repair this deficiency in Part 
II of the present essay, by suggesting just what the traditional 
account has looked like; there I shall also discuss its epistemic 
status. In order to reach that point, however, I shall begin by 
examining Cartesian dream skepticism along with some standard 
criticisms that have been leveled against it. My argument in Part I 
will show that dream skepticism can repel those criticisms, and 
this in turn will lead us to questions about the nature of dreaming. 
* I am grateful to Keith Lehrer, Ralf Meerbote, William Morris, Nathan 
Oaklander, David Sanford, and two anonymous referees from Philosophia 
for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
355 
CHARLES E.M. DUN LOP 
I 
Descartes' skeptical argument is essentially as follows: 
(1) On past occasions I have dreamt that I was in front of  
the fireplace, when in fact I was in bed asleep. 
(2) On some such occasions I was, deceived. 
(3) Therefore, although I am at this moment convinced that I 
am awake and perceiving, I must admit that I may instead 
by asleep and dreaming. 
Attacks on this argument are often aimed at the second 
premise. In order to evaluate them, however, we must first con- 
sider the senses in which dreams might be regarded as deceptive. 
The famous passage in Meditation II suggests the following formu- 
lation: a is deceived by dream D about S if (i) a is asleep; (ii) as a 
result of  D, it seems to a that a certain state of affairs S exists; 
(iii) S does not exist. This seems to be precisely what G.E. Moore 
had in mind when he wrote: 
It certainly does, however, often happen that we do dream 
that so-and-so is the case, without at the time thinking 
that we are only dreaming; and in such cases, I think we may 
perhaps be said to think that what we dream is the case is the 
case, and to be deceived if it is not the case; and therefore 
also, in such cases, if what we dream to be the case happens 
also to be the case, we may be said to be thinking truly that 
it is the case, although we certainly do not know that it is. 4 
Now, according to both Descartes and Moore, the concept o f  
dreaming seems to make room for the concept of  believing (and 
perhaps other things as well); Moore's position is stronger than 
Descartes', inasmuch as it supposes that a dream is accompanied 
by, or consists of, one or more beliefs, s It follows from their 
views that dreams involve beliefs, acquired during sleep. To acquire 
a false belief in this way is to be 'deceived by a dream'. 
Descartes and Moore think that people are sometimes deceived 
while they are asleep. This might be called 'concurrent dream 
deception' (which I shall abbreviate as CDD). A more conservative 
claim would be that people are deceived by dreams, but that their 
false beliefs do not come about before they awaken. This view can 
be called 'retrospective dream deception' (RDD), and analyzed as 
follows: a is deceived retrospectively by dream D about S ff and 
only if (i) a is awake; (ii) while awake, a comes to hold a false 
belief about S; ('tii) a's false belief about S is a causal result of  D. 
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There is, I think, no difficulty in acknowledging the pos- 
sibility of RDD. But it is also clear that RDD provides no basis for 
Cartesian skepticism; the second premise of Descartes' argument 
requires something stronger. Thus, we must face the question of 
whether CDD represents a live possibility. We can say that a 
person is undergoing CDD, that is, he is deceived concurrently by 
dream D about S, if and only if (i) he is asleep; (ii) while asleep, 
he acquires the false belief that some state of  affairs S exists; (iii) 
his belief is a causal result of  D. 
Although the proposed formula for CDD makes use of the 
notion of belief, it does not entail a commitment to any special 
analysis of belief. It should be clear that the proposal is consistent 
with a purely dispositJonal account, in the behaviorist tradition. 
But one may also speak of beliefs as occurring, or coming into 
existence with conscious awareness, during sleep. Without pre- 
supposing either analysis of  belief, however, some philosophers 
have held that the impossibility of CDD (and thus the untenability 
of dream skepticism) could be derived from an appeal to the 
concept of dreaming. I believe this to be a mistake, although a 
subtle one, given the prima facie plausibility of  their position. For 
example, L.E. Thomas claims that 
[i] f when I was presumably awake I was in any doubt as to 
whether I was not really dreaming, then no supplementary 
observations could help to resolve any doubts one whir. For if 
I were indeed dreaming then any additional observations 
would themselves be dream observations. 6 
Margaret Macdonald accepts a view of the same sort: 
According to Descartes a dreamer supposes that what he 
dreams are real objects and incidents and is thus deceived. But 
this is false. At most a dreamer may dream that he affirms the 
reality of what he dreams. 7 
And Fred. I. Dretske has recently taken the position that 
Is] uch arguments as 'He imagined he saw a rat '  of  'He dreamed 
he saw a dragon' must be understood, not as saying that he 
visually differentiated a dream dragon but, rather, that he 
imagined he saw (visually differentiated) a rat or dreamed he 
saw a dragon (in which case no visual differentiation occurs; 
hence the existence condition is not appropriately invoked). 8 
These quotations can be boiled down to a formula: if  a is dream- 
ing, he cannot ~t~ (believe that p, wish that p, suppose that p, 
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seem to see that ~p, etc.); instead, he can only dream that he ep'S. 
Is there any reason to accept this view? 
I think that a negative answer is justified. In the first place, it 
is clearly not the case that 'a dreamt that p '  entails '-p'. (If  I 
dream that Boston is in Massachusetts, it hardly follows that 
Boston is not  in Massachusetts.) Nor does the situation change 
when 'p '  is replaced by  a psychological verb. This point is most 
obvious if 'p '  is replaced by 'dream'  ( 'a dreamt that he dreamt'  
cannot entail 'a did not dream'),  but there seems to be no reason 
for rejecting it in the case of  other psychological verbs either. So 
far, then, the logic of  'dream' does not force us to conclude that a 
dreamer is incapable of  acquiring a belief, making an observation 
(Thomas),  affirming something to be true (Macdonald), or making 
visual differentiations (Dretske). There is, to be sure, a crucial 
difference between (a) dreaming that I believe (observe, affirm, 
etc.) something, and (b) really believing (observing, affirming, etc.) 
something while asleep. The point, however, is that the possibility 
of  a state o f  affairs such as (a) does not preclude the possibility of  
a state of  affairs such as (b). 
It is easy to see why philosophers may have been led to think 
that the possibility of  (a) does preclude the possibility of  (b). 
Suppose that while sleeping, a person met with certain beliefs and 
thoughts. It would be difficult to maintain that only some of  
these were dream items, for we have no clear criterion for sorting 
out mental processes during sleep in this way. It seems to follow, 
therefore, that beliefs acquired during sleep are dream-beliefs; 
thoughts occurring during sleep are dream-thoughts, etc. But this 
terminology can easily lead to a mistake, for a 'dream-belief'  could 
be either a belief I only dreamt I held, or an actual belief acquired 
while I was asleep. Anyone who fails to see the latter inter- 
pretation might then think it true that a belief which I acquire 
during my sleep is a belief which I only dream that I hold, i.e., 
that there is no difference between acquiring a belief while asleep, 
and acquiring a belief in a dream, ha the absence of  independent 
arguments, however, this conclusion is simply an ignoratio 
elenchi. 9 
The formula for CDD required that (i) the person is asleep; 
(ii) he acquires a false belief during sleep; and (iii) the false belief 
is a causal result o f  his dream. However, Leonard Linsky claims 
that 
... a man who is dreaming does not have a false belief that he 
is, e.g., flying by flapping his wings, any more than the man 
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who is watching himself on the screen in the cinema has a 
false belief that he is riding a horse in Arizona and not sitting 
in the cinema. And notice that the dream and the movie can 
be frightening nevertheless. It would be as wrong to argue that 
because I am frightened by my dream, I must believe that the 
things I dream about are really happening as it would be to 
argue that because the movie frightened me, I must have 
believed that the things I saw on the screen were really 
occurring (whatever that  means). And yet we might comfort 
the frightened child by saying 'I t 's  only a movie' just as we 
might say to him, 'It was only a dream'. 1~ 
There is some truth in Linsky's position, inasmuch as 'a dreamt 
that p' does not entail 'a believed that p' .  It seems to me, 
however, that there is an important difference between the dream 
case and the cinema case. We cease to be frightened by the dream 
once we realize that it was a dream; this suggests that the dream 
involved a false belief which is eradicated by waking experience. 
But adults do not cease to be frightened by a film simply in virtue 
of  an analogous 'post-cinematic' realization. So I agree that adults 
who are frightened by a film are not necessarily acquiring false 
beliefs; perhaps Coleridge's phrase 'willing suspension of  disbelief' 
is a more apt description of  their situation. Nonetheless, we can 
comfort a frightened adult (or a frightened child) by saying 'It  was 
only a dream', just as we might comfort a frightened child by 
saying 'It 's only a movie'. And in all of  these cases we have 
presumably shown the person that what he thought to be real is 
not; i.e., we have induced him to give up a false belief. 
The case where we wake up frightened seems to provide some 
evidence for CDD. But the formula for CDD allows for non- 
frightening false beliefs to be acquired during sleep. If  it is admit- 
ted that fear-producing beliefs can be acquired in sleep, then these 
other beliefs would seem admissible as well. We are not  compelled, 
of  course, to say that any beliefs are acquired during sleep; one 
co u M hold that they come about as we awaken. I shall suggest 
later on that future physiological discoveries may help to ad- 
judicate between these alternatives (and even our present know- 
ledge points toward the first). But this is only to say what I have 
already admitted - that the issue cannot be resolved by a simple 
appeal to a concept o f  dreaming. Certainly there is some support 
for the view that CDD may occur. In any case, I have argued that 
a standard reason for rejecting this view is inadequate. 
It is true, I think, that in everyday life CDD is of  little 
359 
C H A R L E S  E.M. DUNLOP 
interest. Furthermore, if a person acquires a false belief during 
sleep, but one which vanishes when he awakens, it is not likely to 
be manifested in behavior. But CDD does assume a prominent 
theoretical role, for Descartes' dream argument could not have 
arisen without it. 
This last point is perhaps not obvious; one might be indined 
to suppose that Descartes' dream problem could be fonnulated 
even if there existed no possibility of acquiring beliefs during 
sleep. For it could still be the case that people dream. And my 
present musing (so the argument would go), instead of being real, 
would only be dreamt. If so, it would follow that I am deceived. 11 
But what does 'only dreamt' come to now? The proponent of 
this argument is treating 'dream' as an irreducible predicate; i.e., it 
is never the case, on his view, that we may replace 'I dreamt that 
p' by 'During sleep I came to believe that p', etc. But then how 
does he know that in cases where I "only dream' it follows that I 
am deceived? For all we know, this irreducible predicate ('dreams') 
behaves like 'imagines' rather than 'falsely believes'. 12 If this is 
true, dreaming does not entail deception, and the possibility that I 
might now 'only be dreaming' provides no Cartesian worry what- 
ever. The only escape would be to stipulate that '-p & a dreamt 
that p' entails 'a was deceived'. This procedure is wholly in- 
defensible, however. In the first place it does not fit with our 
usual notion of dreaming, according to which dreams are at least 
very often like fictions which we do not take seriously. Secondly, 
if 'dreams that' does not at least entail 'believes that' or 'thinks 
that', the proposed stipulation seems unintelligible. 
The connection which philosophers have seen between dream 
skepticism and the problem of acquiring beliefs during sleep may 
be summed up as follows. Suppose it is granted that Descartes' 
skeptical conclusion does follow from his two premisses. Further- 
more, his first premise seems unexceptionable. His second premise, 
which requires that sleepers can be deceived, presupposes that a 
sleeper can acquire false beliefs. Thus, the question of whether the 
dream argument is sound reduces to the question of whether 
sleepers can acquire false beliefs (CDD). 
II 
I have been arguing that Cartesian skepticism can be defended 
against some common sorts of  criticism, and I have mentioned 
considerations which lend prima facie plausibility to CDD. But 
since any defense of traditional dream skepticism appears to rest 
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squarely on the claim that a sleeper may acquire false beliefs from 
his dream, we must inquire further into the status of that claim. 
It will be useful to begin by suggesting a fairly precise account 
of what dreaming is: 
a is dreaming about X, if and only if a is asleep, and at least 
one of the following conditions is met: 
(i) while asleep, a comes to r about (of, for) X, where 'r is 
replaced by an intentional 13 verb; 
(ii) while asleep, a comes to seem to ff X, where 'if' is 
replaced by a perception verb; 
(iii) while asleep a comes to be in emotional state 0 directed 
toward X. 
This approach, I believe, is consonant with a traditional approach 
to dreaming, although it could be interpreted either mentalisticaUy or 
behavioristically (via EEG patterns, galvanic skin responses, waking 
past-tense reports, etc.). Now, it is possible that something further 
should be added, or that one of the conditions should be ex- 
punged. But I do not want to argue that here. The more im- 
portant question is whether the occurrence of psychological states 
referred to in (i) - (iii) (and most important, the acquisition of 
belief) is compatible with a sleeping state. 
I do not believe that we can conclusively derive either an 
affirmative or a negative answer from the concept of dreaming. 
Thus, in one clear sense, no answer is available at present. But this 
is mainly because we do not have the equipment to ascertain the 
content of anyone's mental life, waking or sleeping. One might 
think of the electroenecephalograph, but it has severely restricted 
applications. The EEG machine can be used as an indicator that 
someone's mental life is ongoing; what that content is lies largely 
outside the machine's diagnostic capabilities. From this point of 
view, it would appear possible (~ la Malcolm) that dreaming is an 
irreducible psychological attitude, nevertheless (contra Malcolm) 
contingently associated with mental states such as judgments or 
beliefs. What we need, of course, is a machine capable of giving 
physiological criteria of subjectively distinguishable states: thought, 
sensations, etc. But such a 'cerebroscope' at present exists only in 
the imaginations of philosophers. 
Even though the EEG machine cannot vindicate the tradition- 
al account of dreaming, there are biological reasons for thinking 
that future scientific developments might vindicate it. There are 
already apparent many interesting biological similarities between 
Stage I/REM sleep and the waking state, and recent research 
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indicates 'that in many of  its characteristics the D-state bears a 
much closer resemblance to waking than to S-sleep'. 14 
This, of course, does not prove that the traditional account of 
dreaming is true. But what would count as a proof?. Let us 
suppose that we did have the ideal brain machine, described two 
paragraphs back, along with a well-confirmed neurophysiological 
theory, such that the machine's readings could be regarded as an 
accurate indicator of a subject's mental life. Granting that it pro- 
vided a means for determining when a waking subject is having 
beliefs, thinking discursively, etc., we should have powerful 
grounds for attributing these states to a sleeping subject if at times 
during the night his brain activity registered similarly on the 
machine. ~s Appropriate dream reports would confirm these attri- 
butions. 
Such a result would count very heavily in favor of the 
traditional view of dreaming. But other cases are surely possible. 
Suppose that the physiological states associated with waking 
beliefs and images were found not to be present when people 
reported having had beliefs etc. during sleep. Would this prove that 
sleepers do not acquire beliefs? Not necessarily, I think. We might 
then look to see whether a different physiological state (i.e., 
during sleep) could consistently be associated with reports of  
beliefs acquired during sleep. So, if a subject reported that just 
prior to awakening, he had been in a particular belief state, and if 
a prior physiological state (during sleep) could be consistently 
associated with this kind of report, then we could perhaps still 
reasonably conclude that beliefs occur in sleep. We could also then 
regard the physiological states associated with sleeping beliefs as 
functionally equivalent to the physiological states associated with 
waking beliefs. But at this point other possibilities begin to 
emerge. It could be, for example, that the measured physiological 
states during sleep are (unexperienced) causes of beliefs which 
occur as we awaken. A decision here would perhaps require appeal 
to additional physiological data concerning experiences in general, 
together with an evaluation of the explanatory power of rival 
theories) 6 The important point, however, is that the concept of 
dreaming cannot by itself yield a solution. 
A final experimental result may be envisaged for the sake of 
completeness. If the brain machine gave accurate results for 
waking life, and failed to indicate the presence of  beliefs, etc. 
when applied to sleepers, and if no consistent physiological states 
could be discovered to correlate with the beliefs, etc. which a 
subject claimed to have had during sleep - then we ought to 
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conclude that in fact he did not come to be in those psychological 
states during sleep. Needless to say, I seriously doubt that this 
would happen, since our present EEG studies already suggest the 
presence of psychological states during sleep. But such a situation 
is at least logically possible. And if it did occur, an investigation 
might search for neuro-physiological events occurring during the 
moments of awakening - events which would explain the subject's 
false belief that he had been in certain states while asleep. It is 
hardly conceivable, I think, that this inquiry also would produce a 
negative result. 
If  the final solution (just envisaged) came to pass, the 
traditional view of dreaming would call for radical revision. But it 
seems to me that this is a possibility which must be countenanced, 
as can be seen from reflection upon the fate of  many of our 
earlier theories (witches and phlogiston are but two examples). 
Conditions (i) - (iii) (given at the beginning of this section), 
therefore, constitute an analysis of dreaming, insofar as they in- 
dicate what the traditional concept of dreaming has looked like. 
But this should not be taken to indicate that the concept is 
immune to revision. The discovery that beliefs, etc. can be ac- 
quired during sleep, I have suggested, would call for no conceptual 
revisions; but I have imagined other discoveries which would alter 
our concept of  dreaming. In any case, it is folly to attempt to 
secure through analysis those conclusions to which experiment is 
clearly relevant. 
I conclude that CDD, and with it Cartesian skepticism, is a 
possibility so far as our present concept of dreaming is concerned; 
conceptual considerations have failed to rule it out. It is also a 
possibility given our present scientific knowledge about dreaming. 
Thus, contrary to both the traditional view and the anti-traditional 
view, I am maintaining that questions concerning the nature of 
dreaming cannot be settled on purely a priori grounds. None- 
theless, if my position is correct, it has been established a priori 
that either the traditional view or the Macdonald-Malcolm view 
may turn out to be true. 
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